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In this paper I draw lessons from two quasi-natural experiments (the transition process in 
former Communist countries and the rapid globalization of food chains) on the optimality of 
farms and agricultural structures more generally. I argue that (a) the farm structures that have 
emerged from the transition process are much more diverse than expected ex ante; (b) this 
diversity is to an important extent determined by economic mechanisms which are influenced 
by initial conditions (eg technology) and reform policies; (c) non-traditional farm structures 
have  played  an  important  role  during  transition  since  they  were  optimal  to  address  the 
specific institutional and structural constraints imposed by the transition process; (d) there is 
more diversity than often argued in the farms that are integrated in global food chains; (e) 
endogenous  institutional (contracting)  innovations in food chains may lock existing farm 
structures in a long-run institutional framework; and (f) indicators based on farm structures 
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Quiz :  
Which country has the following farm structure characteristics ?
1 
 
More than 50% of farmers are older than 55 years. 
75% are part-time farmers. 
96% are family farms. 
59% of farms cultivate less than 5 hectares 





There is an extensive literature on the optimality of farms and agricultural structures more 
generally.  In this paper I attempt to contribute to this literature by drawing lessons from two 
important global changes in food and agricultural systems over the past 25 years which have 
major  implications  for  farm  structures  and  which  can  be  interpreted  as  quasi-natural 
experiments to study the optimality of farm structures.  The first is the transition process in 
former Communist countries from a centrally planned and government organized system to 
one organized by individual agents and the market.  This process affected more than a billion 
people, many of them farmers, and a important share of the world’s productive area. The 
second change is the rapid globalization of food chains which has integrated consumers, food 
companies, and farmers and has lead to important restructuring in production, trading and 
marketing systems across the globe and in particular in high value markets which have been 
spreading to transition and developing countries.  
These two changes were not unrelated. The spread of modern and international food 
supply chains has been very intense in transition countries after these countries opened up for 
                                                 
1 The answer is given in appendix.    3 
foreign investments and trade.  Inversely, many developing countries which are not usually 
classified under the umbrella of “transition countries” experienced processes of liberalization 
and  privatization  in  their  food  and  agricultural  systems  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  which 
contributed to the spread of modern and global food supply chains in these markets as well.  
However, for the purpose of this review we will consider the two processes and changes as 
separate.     
In  this  paper  I  draw  lessons  from  these  changes  on  the  optimality  of  farms  and 
agricultural structures. The paper draws strongly on my past research work on these issues 
with various co-authors and I will refer to specific papers and books for more elaborate 
arguments and detailed analyses than is possible in the short space of this paper.  The paper 
makes several key arguments. First, the farm structures that have emerged from the transition 
process  are  much  more  diverse  than  expected  ex  ante.  Second,  this  diversity  in  farm 
structures  is  to  an  important  extent  determined  by  economic  mechanisms  which  are 
influenced by initial conditions (eg technology) and reform policies. Third, “non-traditional” 
farm structures have played an important role during transition since they were optimal to 
address the specific institutional and structural constraints imposed by the transition process. 
Fourth, regarding the impact of the globalization of food chains, there is more diversity than 
often argued in the farms that are integrated in global food chains and, fifth, endogenous 
institutional (contracting) innovations in these food chains may lock existing farm structures 
in a long-run institutional framework. Finally, the paper argues that indicators based on farm 
structures are not a good measure of welfare effects of the globalization of food chains.  
  The paper is organized as follows. The first section describes how farm structures 
have  evolved  and  emerged  in  the  transition  countries.  The  second  section  gives  a  brief 
overview  of  the  literature  on  the  optimality  of  farm  structures.    I  build  on  the  existing 
theories to provide a series of hypotheses to explain structural developments in transition   4 
agriculture  and  provide  evidence  on  this.    The  next  section  of  the  paper  reviews  how 
institutional changes, such as the emergence of contracting and vertical coordination, have 
been endogenous in the globalization of supply chains, and what the implications are for 
small and large farms, and for welfare; as well as for future structural developments. 
 
The Development of Farm Structures in Transition 
Ex ante, there were two sets of arguments forwarded on the development of farm structures 
in transition countries after land reform and liberalization.  The first argument posited that 
farm  workers  in  transition  countries  had  so  little  required  human  capital,  managerial 
expertise and entrepreneurship for managing a farm that they would not start farming on their 
own.  This argument predicted that the large farms would continue to operate, albeit in an 
adjusted mode reflecting different environments. 
  The  second  argument  predicted  the  opposite.    It  argued  that,  since  communist-
designed collective and state farms were very inefficient, liberalization and removal of state 
control would lead to their collapse, and therefore there would be a total shift to family farms 
(or “individual farming”). 
When looking at what happened in reality, a first remarkable observation is that none 
of these arguments were correct, or both, depending on the way one looks at it (see figure 1).  
A large diversity of farm structures has emerged in the transition world, incorporating both 
extremes and everything in between.
2  Farms vary widely in size and organization, from 
small household plots, over family farms, to large co-operatives or farming companies.  One 
extreme is Slovakia where almost all land is used by large farming corporations. The other 
extreme is in countries such as Albania, Azerbaijan, China, etc. where land use by individual 
                                                 
2 See also Lerman, Csaki and Feder (2004) on this.   5 
farms grew rapidly during transition and where almost all land is used by small individual 
farms.   
A second interesting observation is that there are also important differences within 
countries.  In fact, many countries have a mix of large and small farms. Some of these 
differences reflect differentiations by region or commodity. For example, in Kazakhstan the 
northern regions are dominated by vast grain producing farming corporations, sometimes 
using hundreds of thousands of hectares, while the cotton areas in the south are dominated by 
very small household farms (Gray, 2000).  In Russia, around 60% of agricultural output is 
produced by household plots (see figure 2).  However, the vast majority of the land is used 
by large  farms, sometimes organized in  huge agro-holdings.  One example of such agro-
holding  is  the  Orel  Niva  holding,  which controls  337,000  hectares  of  land  and  employs 
16,000  workers.  It  processes  200-300,000  tons  of  wheat.  Its  activities  include  102  large 
farms, 28 processing plants, 100 trade organizations, 32 service enterprises, etc. (Gataulina et 
al, 2006). 
Third, within the diversity of farm structures that could be observed, there were a 
remarkable number of “non-traditional” farm structures, meaning that many farm structures 
observed  in  these  countries  were  not  the  ones  we  typically  observe  in  Western  market 
economies. Examples include the Russian vertically integrated farming companies mentioned 
above, but also farm partnerships in former East Germany, farm production associations and 
networks of former collective farms and household plots in various countries (see further).   
Fourth, studies estimating the efficiency of the various farm structures yield mixed 
results, and their findings often are not consistent with the simple premise that family farms 
are the most efficient farm structures.  In an excellent review of the studies on this issue, 
Davidova and Gorton (2004) conclude that there are no clear and consistent conclusions on   6 
the optimality of specific farm structures across the studies that they reviewed.
3  In particular 
they conclude that there is no clear evidence of corporate farms being inherently less efficient 
than family farms and that even when family farms are on average more efficient, some 
corporate farms also perform as well as the best family farms.   
Finally, another remarkable variation between countries concerning farm structures is 
in how farms have adjusted labor use during transition. In some countries, farms absorbed 
labor,  while  in  other  countries  farms  massively  shed  labor,  even  in  the  early  years  of 
transition (figure 3). The differences are huge: from a strong increase in some of the Central 
Asian countries to a dramatic decline of more than 50% of official employment in Central 
Europe (see figure 3a).  We do not only observe such large difference between very different 
regions, but also within regions and even within countries. For example, on average the 
outflow  of  labor  in  Poland  was  much  lower  than  in  neighbouring  Slovakia  and  Czech 
Republic (see figure 3b), but within Poland there are huge differences between regions (see 
figure 3c).  Another reason why these variations are so remarkable is that the variation in 
adjustments of other inputs was much less: in all the European transition countries, land use 
was roughly constant and capital inputs declined strongly during the first years of transition.   
 
A Brief Review on the Optimality of Farm Structures 
There is an extensive literature on the optimality of farm sizes and structures.  Most of the 
literature of farm efficiency finds that there are relatively few economies of scale in farm 
operations,  albeit  it  with  some  important  modifications.    The  main  argument  relates  to 
relative imperfections in the labor markets versus the capital and product markets (Eswaran 
and Kotwal, 1985;  Feder, 1985; Pollak, 1985). The essence of the argument goes as follows. 
                                                 
3 See Davidova and Gorton (2004) for a list of reference on studies on farm efficiency in transition.    7 
  Farming  is  characterized  by  important  supervision  costs  because  in  most 
circumstances  farm  workers’  true  efforts  are  not  easily  observable,  due  to  the  specific 
characteristics of agricultural production.  Such imperfections imply that wage workers have 
limited incentives to exert effort, and either need to be supervised at a cost or be offered 
contracts that provide higher incentives, such as sharecropping.   
  Family members have higher incentives to provide effort than hired labor.  They 
share in output risk and can be employed with no or less supervision costs. This is the main 
advantage of family farming over wage-labor based farming.   
  These advantages may be offset by disadvantages of family farms in accessing credit 
and other markets.  It is well known that rural credit markets are notoriously imperfect and 
that especially poor and small farmers are constrained in formal credit markets.  Larger and 
richer farms may have easier access to credit, either because their initial wealth is larger (for 
self-financing) or because their transaction costs in credit markets are lower.  Another reason 
is access to output or input markets.  Small farmers in remote areas may not be able to sell 
their products to urban markets, or they may get lower prices from traders.  Small farmers 
may  be  less  likely  to  access  (quality)  inputs  for  their  production.  Hence,  in  such  cases, 
imperfections of the input, output, and credit markets have the opposite effect of labor market 
imperfections in determining the optimal farm size.   
The combination of these theoretical arguments are used to explain the findings of 
empirical  studies,  which  often  find  an  inverse  U-function  between  size  and  efficiency.  
Efficiency  grows  with  size  for  the  smallest  farms,  but  beyond  a  certain  size,  typically 
coinciding with larger family farms, there is a declining relation between size and efficiency.   
However, not surprisingly, these relative effects, and hence the “optimum” depends 
on the nature of the farm activity (livestock, crops, …), on the available technology, on 
relative  factor  abundance,  on  market  imperfections,  and  on  existing  regulations  and   8 
institutions.  To understand the farm restructuring during transition, we need to explicitly 
look at these factors and to how they vary between countries.  
 
Technology, Endogenous Farm Restructuring, and the Nature of Productivity Gains 
Technology and factor abundance have an important impact on the relative efficiency 
of different farm organizations, and thus on the incentives for farm restructuring.  They affect 
both the costs and benefits of the shift to individual farming, as summarized in Figure 4.  
As explained above, an important factor in the optimal scale of farming is transaction 
costs in labour management. Large operations in agriculture face transaction costs because of 
principal agent problems and monitoring  costs in  labour contracting, which are typically 
large in agriculture (Pollak 1985).  Hence, a shift to individual farming will improve labour 
effort  and  a  farmer’s  control  over  farm  activities  and  this  will  lead  to  efficiency  gains.  
However, the importance of these efficiency gains vary with specialization and technology 
(Allen  and  Lueck  1998).    Since  the  greatest  improvement  in  efficiency  from  farm 
individualization is attributable to rising effort from better incentives, the benefits will be 
relatively greater for systems in which labour plays a greater role.   
However, there are also costs that are incurred when collective or corporate farms are 
broken up into individual farms.  In many cases there are two major types of costs.  First, 
there is one set of costs that could arise due to the loss in scale economies.  As in the case of 
the incentive effects, the impact on scale economies will be sensitive to the nature of the 
technology.  The economy of scale losses may be considerable in the case of capital intensive 
production systems, systems in which we would expect economies of scale to be relatively 
significant  since  there  are  many  fixed  expenses  and  many  large  assets  used  in  farming 
activities.  In countries in which farming is labour intensive and few capital inputs are used, 
however, such losses could be minimal.     9 
Second, there also may be costs associated with disorganization that will occur with 
the restructuring of farms (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland, 2000).  The costs will arise 
from  the  mismatch  that  can  occur  between  the  farm’s  needs  for  inputs,  services  and 
equipment and the infrastructure that has been set up to provide those inputs and services.  
Initially designed for large scale farming, the inputs and services that the nation’s agricultural 
input supply chain are set up to provide are not always suitable for individual farms.  Hence, 
newly formed individual farms may require an entirely different set of inputs, services and 
equipment.  The disorganization and economies of scale costs could be high (initially) if such 
inputs, services, and equipment play an important role in the local farming systems.  Again, 
this is affected by technology.  These disruption costs are more likely to be lower in labour 
intensive  systems  than  in  more  advanced,  integrated  and  capital-intensive  agricultural 
systems.   
There  is  substantial  empirical  evidence  that  these  factors  have  indeed  played  an 
important  role,  in  inducing  so-called  “patterns  of  transition”  with  different  adjustment 
processes occurring in labor intensive countries than in land or capital intensive countries 
(Macours and Swinnen, 2002).  There were very large differences in pre-reform technology 
and relative resource scarcity.  The pre-reform land/labor ratio in, for example, Russia and 
Kazakhstan  was  many  times  higher  than  in,  for  example,  China,  Vietnam,  Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova or Romania.  
The  importance  of  initial  technology/factor  intensity  in  the  growth  of  individual 
farming is illustrated empirically by Figure 5, which shows a strong positive relationship 
between the pre-reform labour intensity of farming and the importance of individual farming 
five years after the start of transition for regional averages. As such, the farm restructuring 
process, in particular the growth of individual farming, is at least partially endogenous in this 
transition process.     10 
In countries with labour-intensive technologies there is a strong shift from large-scale 
collective farming to small-scale individual farming and with it strong gains in technical 
efficiency  with  relatively  small  losses  in  scale  efficiency,  as  we  explained  above.    For 
example, in countries such as China, Vietnam, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, and Romania, 
significant gains in productivity came mostly from the shift to household farming when land 
was distributed to rural households.  In all these countries the man/land ratio was over 0.2 
persons per hectare and total factor productivity increased strongly during early transition 
(between 4 per cent and 9 per cent annually) when individual farming grew from 8 per cent 
of total land use on average to 84 per cent on average (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).
4   
In  contrast,  in  capital  and  land  intensive  regions,  large-scale  corporate  farming 
remained important and productivity gains came primarily from large farms shedding labour 
with privatization of the farms. For example in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, 
countries in which farming was more capital and land intensive (man/land ratio of 0.14 or 
less), gains in labour productivity came primarily from large farms shedding labour with 
privatization of the farms.  During the first five years of transition, labour use declined by 44 
per cent on average in these three countries (figure 3), yielding an annual increase in labour 
productivity of 7.5 per cent on average, while individual farms used only 15 per cent of the 
land. 
Another  implication  of  these  differential  adjustment  patterns  is  that  the  labor 
adjustments, as we discussed them above (see figure 3), were strongly correlated with the 
farm restructuring process; and that both these elements should be seen as parts of a joint 
                                                 
4  A further argument that can be made on this, pushing the endogeneity argument even further, is that in labor 
intensive economies, ultimately a land reform process emerged that was conducive to farm individualization.  
This land reform procedure, i.e. distribution of land in kind to households, often came about only after changes 
were made to the existing policies, such as in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, etc., reflecting changes in 
governments and political economy pressures (Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006).  
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farm/labor adjustment process.
5  Individual farms often absorbed labor, while large farms, 
where they survived and faced hard budget constraints, such as in Central Europe, laid off 
surplus labor.  These processes contributed to different restructuring patterns as is illustrated 
in figure 6.  In countries such as in Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia, this 
contributed  to  a  massive  outflow  of  labor  from  agriculture  with  limited  shift  to  family 
farming (the CEH pattern in Figure 6). In other countries, such as in Romania and some of 
the Baltic countries, it contributed to an inflow of labor with a strong shift to family farming 
(represented by the RLL pattern in Figure 6). 
 
Land Reform and Farm Fragmentation and Concentration 
Initial  technology  and  resource  abundance  were  not  the  only  factors  that  affected  farm 
restructuring. A very important element of the transition process was the reform of property 
rights, including land reforms.  The most important land reform choices were:  restitution, 
distribution  in  kind  (in  actual  plots),  distribution  of  land  shares,  and  a  combination 
(sequence), e.g. first distribution in shares, then in kind. These differences in land reform 
choices had also important implications for farm restructuring.  
  The dominant land reform procedure in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic 
countries was restitution of land to the former owners that had lost their rights during the 
collectivization  movement  in  the  past.    If  the  original  owners  were  not  alive,  reformers 
restored ownership rights to their closest heirs.  Typically land reform laws restituted land to 
the historical boundaries.  If restitution to the original boundaries was not possible, former 
                                                 
5 See Swinnen, Dries and Macours (2005) for detailed cross-country evidence and an econometric analysis to 
estimate the role of various factors in this joint process; Dries and Swinnen (2004) for a theoretical model and 
an empirical analysis of regional variations in Poland; and Macours and Swinnen (2005, 2008) for an analysis 
of the role of migration in this process and its implication for rural poverty.  
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owners received rights to a plot of land of comparable size and quality.
6    Distribution of 
land has been done by allocating physical plots (such as in Albania) or in shares (such as in 
Russia and Kazakhstan) or first in shares and later in physical plots (such as in Azerbaijan).   
  There is a complex impact of the land reforms on farm restructuring.  Here I limit the 
discussion to a few important effects.  I first argue that land restitution, such as implemented 
in most of Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the consolidation of large farms, instead 
of to its fragmentation – as was mostly argued.  Second, I argue that the distribution of land 
in-kind contributed to individualization, and third, that shares distribution has contributed to 
farm  consolidation  and,  more  recently,  to  a  concentration  of  land  ownership,  and  thus 
inequality.  
 
Land distribution, labor market constraints and farm fragmentation 
Fragmentation of land due to the restitution process is often cited as a constraint on farming.  
However, evidence suggests that labor market constraints may be a more fundamental cause 
of fragmentation. 
First, fragmentation of ownership may have contributed more to consolidation than to 
fragmentation of land use.  Fragmentation of ownership is very strong in Central Europe (eg 
Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary) while this has not led to a fragmentation of land use, 
but the contrary is true: farm land is very consolidated through rental agreements. Mathijs 
and Swinnen (1998) explain how the nature of transaction costs in land markets actually led 
to a consolidation of land.  Restitution in many countries gave land back to individuals that 
were no longer active in agriculture, most commonly to either former farmers or their heirs.  
Except for the case in some of the poorer countries, the new landowners did not return to 
farming  and  primarily  were  interested  in  renting  their  land.    Because  the  search  and 
                                                 
6 In several countries restitution was combined with other land reform programs, for example, voucher 
privatization (Hungary), distribution of state land (Romania) or the leasing of state-owned land (Czech 
Republic).   13 
negotiations costs of identifying individuals that were willing to rent the land were so high, 
the easiest way for the new land owners to find a renter was to contact those that were 
already using the land.  Consequently, in most cases the new renters became those that had 
been involved with farming on the large pre-reform farms.   
  Transaction costs also favoured the large farmers from the point of view of their 
search for land to rent.  Almost all of those that farmed after reform were those that were 
active in agriculture prior  to reform.  Most were farm  workers or cooperative members.  
Since land was restituted to people outside agriculture, if they wanted to stay in farming, they 
were forced to search for the owners of the land and strike a rental contract.  However, since 
the management of the large farms was closely involved in the restitution process, they had 
an  information advantage  in identifying the new owners.  Transaction costs on  both the 
supply and demand side gave an advantage to large farms.  As a result, after restitution, farm 
size did not fragment as much as had been feared.  Although a small farming class did 
emerge everywhere, many large farms did not disappear and the agricultural sector in several 
CEE countries remained characterized by a dual farm structure. 
Second, a closer look at the fragmentation of land use across Eastern Europe suggests 
that fragmentation has less to do with the land market than with the labour market.  Figure 7 
illustrates that land use fragmentation is strongly correlated with the employment structure of 
the economy.  In the mid 1990s there was an almost perfectly linear relationship between the 
share  of  land  used  by  very  small  farms  and  labour  employed  in  agriculture.    Land  use 
fragmentation was a problem mostly in countries where too many rural households had to 
rely on agriculture.  
  In-country survey data also confirm that within countries fragmentation of land and 
small plots are essentially associated  with old, often retired, and part-time farmers.  For 
example in Hungary, both larger family farms and large corporate farms in Hungary use   14 
large and consolidated land plots.  Commercial farms rent a large share of the land they 
operate (Vranken and Swinnen, 2006).  Hence, this evidence is consistent with the earlier 
conclusion that if there is a fragmentation problem, it is primarily caused by labour market 
constraints. 
  In several countries (eg. Moldova, Bulgaria, Albania) rural households have tried to 
cope with labor market constraints by migrating to urban areas or to other countries (Macours 
and  Swinnen,  2005).    Migration  and  the  associated  remittances  have  contributed  to  the 
growth of farming, and to a lesser extent of rental markets, by allowing households to obtain 
a more productive labor/land ratio, by reducing credit constraints, and by stimulating the 
supply of land in labor intensive agricultural systems. 
   
Distribution in kind and farm individualization 
The distribution of land in specific plots (boundaries) created much stronger property 
rights for the new owners than with share distribution.  The distribution of shares has often 
implied uncertain property rights and high transaction costs.
7  The stronger rights and lower 
transaction costs (with distribution in plots) allowed a stronger growth of family farms as it 
was easier for these new farms to access their land.  For example, the distribution of land in 
kind lead to the rapid growth of family farming in China in the late 1970s, in Vietnam in the 
1980s, in Albania in the early 1990s, in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova in the 
second half of the 1990s.  In all countries, within a few years after the start of the land 
reform, a large share of agricultural land shifted to family farms.  In contrast, where land 
shares were distributed (e.g. Russia, Kazakhstan and pre-2000 Ukraine), the shift of land use 
to family farms was much less.  
                                                 
7  Individuals usually had to declare their intention to start up their own farm in order to take physical possession of 
their land. However, the barriers to exit were severe as leaving the farm was often discouraged by farm managers and 
local officials.  In addition, in several countries, the share distribution system was accompanied by continued soft 
budget  constraints  for  the  large  farms  (eg  in  Ukraine,  Russia  and  Kazakhstan),  further  reducing  incentives  for 
restructuring of the farms.    15 
 
Land shares and the growth of mega-farms 
Another  effect  of  the  land  share  distribution  system  is  that  it  has  allowed  a 
concentration of land ownership, much more so than the other types of land reform. Shares 
were exchanged without being linked to specific plots.  In several cases, workers transferred 
their land shares to the corporate farm, for example in exchange for employment.  When 
farms were sold, often after bankruptcy, the land shares were now part of the farm assets, and 
investors who took over the farm became land owners.  This process led to the concentration 
of  land  ownership,  e.g.  in  parts  of  Russia  and  Kazakhstan,  with  vertically  integrated 
companies  owning  now  hundreds  of  thousands  of  hectares  of  land.    In  contrast,  land 
distribution in plots and restitution
8 has led to more egalitarian land ownership distributions.   
 
The Role of Factor Market Imperfections and Institutions 
Imperfections in output and input markets and existing institutions are particularly important 
in transition countries, where there are substantial market imperfections and where traditional 
institutions, for e.g. product marketing and input supplies, have been designed to serve large 
scale farms.  In the absence of such institutions for small scale farms, it is not surprisingly 
that large scale farms have remained more prominent than would have been predicted based 
on models from countries where institutions were much more targeted to smaller farms.  In 
countries  with  a  more  supportive  institutional  environment  for  small-scale  farming,  the 
family farms should be expected to be more efficient relative to large corporate farms than in 
countries where small family farms are a relatively new phenomena.  
                                                 
8    The  ownership  distribution  following  the  restitution  process  depends  on  the  pre-collectivization  ownership 
distribution. This distribution was relatively egalitarian as it was typically preceded by a Communist-imposed land 
reform which distributed land from large landowners and institutions (such as the Church) to landless peasants and 
small farmers.  The main exception is Albania where the pre-collectivization was very inegalitarian (feudal).  This 
was one of the reasons why restitution was heavily opposed in Albania and the government distributed the land 
equally to rural households (Cungu and Swinnen, 1999; Swinnen, 1999).    16 
Furthermore, non-traditional farm structures have turned out to be well fitted for this 
specific environment.  For example, at the end of the 1990s in Romania the most efficient 
farm organization for resource-constrained small farmers were “family societies” in which 
farmers  collectively  share  in  the  provision  of  mechanized  services  (Sabates-Wheeler,  R. 
2002). In East Germany, “partnerships” (small groups of farmers in that pooled their effort in 
certain production and marketing tasks) outperformed all other forms of farm organization 
between  1992  and  1997  (Mathijs  and  Swinnen,  2001).  In  Russia  the  most  successful 
household farms refrained from registering as “private farms,” instead choosing to remain 
connected in some fashion to large farm enterprises. Such producers use their connections to 
gain  access  to  inputs,  marketing  channels  and  other  services  in  an  environment  where 
traditional  markets, if any, function  poorly (O’Brien, D. and  S. Wegren, 2002).  Even  in 
Turkmenistan, producers in the early 2000s begun to shift to family-based leasing within the 
nation’s highly regulated environment while at the same time remaining linked to the large 
farms in order to be able to access basic inputs, services and output channels through the 
state marketing order system (Lerman Z. and K. Brooks. 2001).  
The most extreme version of large corporate farms are in the grain producing regions 
of Kazakhstan and Russia. There, huge farms have developed as part of vertically integrated 
agribusiness companies, sometimes owning and operating more than 100,000 hectares have 
emerged.  Scale economies are more important in extensive grain production than in, e.g. 
vegetable or dairy production.  However, the main reasons appear to be transition-specific 
(Gray, 2000). 
A first element is access to inputs. In a very tight capital market these companies 
control a  large  part  of  the  liquid  financial  resources  in  the  regions  concerned  making  it 
possible for them to farm when many other farm types are not assured access to inputs. They 
have access to bank lending, apart from their own liquid resources, on the basis of non-  17 
agricultural assets with higher collateral value. Their vertical ownership in the grain market 
allows them to purchase inputs at the source (e.g., the refinery for fuel) and to avoid barter 
terms. 
A second factor is access to output markets. In northern Kazakhstan, land is not the 
most critical input in the farming process.  It is not surprising that the organization of farming 
in the north is evolving in a way in which land ownership is almost irrelevant. The new 
successful  farms  comprise  a  set  of  property  and  contractual  relationships  in  which  land 
ownership is a peripheral issue. The greatest difference between the large-scale investor-led 
farms and smaller individual farms and partnership farms lies in the difficulties experienced 
by the smaller farms in marketing their output.   
Third,  bargaining  power  with  the  (local)  authorities,  who  still  intervene  in  many 
ways, also played a role.  The oblast authorities continued to play a highly interventionist 
role in agricultural commodity markets, in spite of the greatly reduced role of the state in 
procurement.    In  practice  such  interventions  were  open  to  abuse,  with  favored  (large) 
operators allowed to export grain to neighboring oblasts or to Russia while smaller producers 
are prohibited, often until all outstanding debts for inputs are paid. Moreover, there was a 
widespread practice until the mid 1990s whereby local authorities continued to require farms, 
even after they became producer cooperatives, to engage in production activities which were 
well-known to be loss-making, especially livestock production. The continued dominance of 
the seed industry based on state farm production (in the grain sector) tends to perpetuate the 
single  channel  system  and  places  farms  under  the  control  of  the  local  authorities  which 
continue to determine the physical flows of seed grains (especially when it crosses oblast 
boundaries).  Most farms continue to depend on the local authorities to supply key inputs and 
for finance for these inputs through the issue of local authority guarantees for the provision 
of seed and fuel by supplies on a barter basis against the season’s production.  The increased   18 
size and financial wealth of the large, integrated, grain companies protects them against these 
state interventions.  
Each  of  these  factors  affected  the  relative  efficiency  of  different  production 
structures.  While these examples and arguments are specific to the situation we discuss here, 
the  overall  arguments  appear  to  be  more  generally  valid  and  relevant  for  many  other 
countries and regions in the world where market imperfections are significant and (local) 
public authorities are not (only) interested in fostering economic development but (also) in 
extracting some of the rents.   
 
Farm Structures and Vertical Coordination in Global Supply Chains 
So far we have mostly drawn lessons from the transition of a planned system to a market 
based economy in former Communist countries.  The second driver of change we will look 
into  is  the  rapid  globalization  of  food  chains  which  has  integrated  consumers,  food 
companies, and farmers and has lead to important restructuring in production, trading and 
marketing systems across the globe and in particular in high value markets which have been 
spreading to transition and developing countries.  
These changes have had important impacts on the types of product that have been 
demanded and the way the production takes place, and the organization of exchange within 
the supply chains.  In particular, contracting and vertical coordination in supply chains has 
grown strongly as part of this process.  For example, at the end of the 1990s, in the Czech 
Republic,  Slovakia  and  Hungary,  80%  of  the  corporate  farms,  who  dominated  farm 
production in these countries, sold crops on contract, and 60-85% sold animal products on 
contract; numbers which are considerably higher than on commercial farms in the US or the 
EU.  A survey by White and Gorton (2006) of agri-food processors in five CIS countries 
(Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia) found that food companies which used   19 
contracts  with  suppliers  grew  from  one-third  in  1997  to  almost  three-quarters  by  2003.  
Similarly, contracting and vertical coordination has grown strongly in some of these supply 
chains in Asia and Africa (Gulati et al 2007, Minten et al, 2009; Swinnen 2007).
9  
  Part of these vertical coordination initiatives include the provision of farm assistance 
programmes to the farms.  These farm assistance programmes include a variety of measures, 
such as credit, transportation, physical inputs, and quality control.  However also investment 
loans and bank loan guarantees are provided in several cases. 
  A  2005  comparative  study  by  the  World  Bank  came  to  the  conclusion  that  such 
vertical  coordination  programs  were  important  in  transition  countries  for  several 
commodities, and growing in several cases (World Bank, 2005).  The study concluded that, 
for example, in the dairy sector,  extensive production contracts have developed between 
dairy processors and farms, including the provision of credit, investment loans, animal feed, 
extension services, bank loan guarantees, etc.  In the sugar sector, marketing agreements are 
widespread, but also more extensive contracts, including also input provisions, investment 
loan assistance, etc.  In both the dairy and sugar sectors, the extent of supplier assistance by 
processors  also  goes  considerably  beyond  some  of  the  trade  credit  and  input  assistance 
provided  by  agribusiness  to  farms  in  some  developing  countries.    In cotton,  cotton  gins 
typically contract farms to supply seed cotton and provides them with a variety of inputs.  
This  model,  which  is  common  in  Central  Asia,  resembles  that  of  the  gin  supply  chain 
structure in developing countries, such as in Africa.  However, the extent of contracting and 
supplier assistance seems to be more extensive in Central Asia, with credit, seeds, irrigation, 
fertilizer, etc. being provided by the gins.   In fresh fruits and vegetables, the rapid growth of 
modern retail chains with high demands on quality and timeliness of delivery is changing the 
supply chains.  New supplier contracting, which is developing rapidly as part of these retail 
                                                 
9 An exception is China where most of the exchange of food commodities in supply chains is based on 
spot market exchanges (see Wang et al 2009).     20 
investments,  include  farm  assistance  programs,  which  are  more  extensive  than  typically 
observed in Western markets.  They resemble those in emerging economies, but appear more 
complex in several cases. Finally, in grains there is extensive and full vertical integration in 
Russia and Kazakhstan, where large agro-holdings and grain trading companies own several 
large grain farms in some of the best grain producing regions.  
 
Exclusion of small farms ? 
A key concern is that the process of vertical coordination will exclude a large share of 
farms,  and  in  particular  small  farmers.  There  are  three  important  reasons  for  this.  First, 
transaction costs favor larger farms in supply  chains, since it is easier  for companies  to 
contract with a few large farms than with many small ones. Second, when some amount of 
investment is needed in order to contract with or supply to the company, small farms are 
often more constrained in their financial means for making necessary investments. Third, 
small farms typically require more assistance from the company per unit of output. 
  The concern of the exclusion of small farmers is voiced often and raised in many 
studies, in particular also in the emerging literature on the impact of the growth of modern 
supply chains, which emphasize the shift to larger preferred suppliers and the exclusion of 
small farms (e.g. Reardon et al 1999; Reardon and Barrett, 2000). 
However, the early claims on the exclusion of small farms from vertically integrating 
supply chains were based on limited empirical evidence.  Triggered by a vigorous academic 
and policy debate on these issues a series of new empirical studies have come out that look 
into this issue using much better empirical evidence than was available a few years ago.
10  
The new empirical evidence from a variety of countries show a largely consistent and 
much  more  nuanced  picture.    The  studies  generally  confirm  the  main  hypotheses  that 
                                                 
10  Sets of empirical studies include case studies in Swinnen (2006) on transition countries and in 
Swinnen (2007) for a global set of countries; a forthcoming special issue of World Development edited 
by Tom Reardon, Chris Barrett, Julio Berdegue and myself; and the Regoverning Markets project.    21 
transaction costs and investment constraints are a serious consideration in these chains and 
that processing and  retailing companies  express a  preference for  working with  relatively 
fewer,  larger,  and  modern  suppliers.  However,  empirical  observations  also  show  a  very 
mixed  picture  of  actual  contracting,  with  much  more  small  farms  being  contracted  than 
predicted based on the arguments above.  
  For  example,  surveys  in  Poland,  Romania  and  CIS  find  no  evidence  that  small 
farmers have been excluded over the past six years in developing supply chains (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004; van Berkum, 2005). In the CIS, the vast majority of companies have the 
same or more small suppliers in 2003 than in 1997 (White and Gorton, 2005). Studies on 
high  value export vegetable chains in Africa find  in some cases that production is fully 
organized in small farms (Legge et al, 2006; Minten et al 2009) or fully in large farms 
(Maertens  et  al  2008)  or  mixed  in  small  and  large  farms  (Jaffee,  2003;  Maertens  and 
Swinnen, 2009).  Also in India small farmers play an important role as suppliers in growing 
moderns  supply  chains  (Gulati  et al  2007).  In  China,  production  in  the  rapidly  growing 
vegetable chains (and in  many  other commodities)  is exclusively based on  small farmer 
production (Wang et al 2009). 
There may be variation in the nature of contracts going to different farm structures. 
Often, supplier programs differ to address the characteristics of these varying farms. For 
example, in case studies  of dairy processors investment support for  larger farms  include 
leasing arrangements for on-farm equipment, while assistance programs for smaller dairy 
farms include investments in collection units with micro-refrigeration units (World Bank, 
2005).  
   
Motivations to source from small farms    22 
Hence,  despite  the  apparent  disadvantages  noted  earlier,  the  empirical  evidence 
suggests that vertical coordination with small farmers is widespread. Furthermore, empirical 
evidence  indicates  that  companies  in  reality  work  with  surprisingly  large  numbers  of 
suppliers and of surprisingly small size.  This then begs the question: why, or under which 
circumstances, do companies work with small farmers despite the costs as indicated above ? 
From the studies, there appear to be several reasons. 
  First, the most straightforward reason is that companies have no choice.  In some 
cases, small farmers represent the vast majority of the potential supply base. This is, for 
example, the case in the dairy sector in Poland and Romania, where the vast majority of 
farms only have a few cows, and in many other sectors in transition countries.  Similarly, in 
parts of Africa where land is an important major constraint (such as in vegetable producing 
regions of Madagascar) contracting is mostly with small farms who are the owners or users 
of the land, while in other regions were land is much less a constraints (such as in part of 
Senegal) export companies work more with their own farms which are established on easily 
accessible plots of land. Similarly, in many part of East and South Asia, including China, 
with a high population pressure on the land, sourcing is often from small farmers.   
Second, company preferences for contracting with large farms are not as obvious as 
one  may  think.  While  processors  may  prefer  to  deal  with  large  farms  because  of  lower 
transaction costs in e.g. collection and administration, contract enforcement may be more 
problematic,  and  hence  costly,  with  larger  farms.  For  example,  Van  Berkum  (2006) 
concludes that processors repeatedly emphasized that farms’ “willingness to learn, take on 
board  advise,  and  a  professional  attitude  were  more  important  than  size  in  establishing 
fruitful farm-processor relationships”.  
Third,  in  some  cases  small  farms  may  have  substantive  cost  advantages.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  in  labor  intensive,  high  maintenance,  production  activities  with   23 
relatively small economies of scale, such as dairy or vegetable production.
11 A fourth reason 
is  that  processors  may  actually  prefer  a  mix  of  suppliers  in  order  not  to  become  too 
dependent on a few large suppliers.   
Finally,  processing  companies  also  differ  in  their  willingness  to  work  with  small 
farms. Some processing companies continue to work with small local suppliers even when 
others do not. These companies have been able to design and enforce contracts which both 
the small firms and the companies find beneficial. This suggests that small-scale farmers may 
have future perspectives when effectively organised. 
 
Endogenous Vertical Coordination and Farm Structures 
The evidence presented here suggests an interesting paradox.  With the demand of 
modern supply chains, small farmers may not be able to make the necessary upgrades by 
themselves without support packages by processors or agribusiness.  If there are sufficient 
(quality)  supplies  available  for  processors,  they  will  not  be  willing  to  introduce  such 
vertically coordinated (VC) support packages.  If there are not sufficient supplies, VC will be 
forthcoming.  Hence, we have the paradoxical situation that small poor farms may be best off 
(in the perspective of “supply chain driven development”) if they are in an environment 
which is dominated by small poor farms.   
There is some empirical evidence for this hypothesis. Companies seem to be most 
likely to reach out to small farms when they face a supplier base which is dominated by small 
farmers  not  able  to  supply  the  commodities  they  want,  and least  likely  when  there  is  a 
                                                 
11 For example, Key and Runsten (1999) present evidence that small farmers’ production costs in Mexican 
vegetable  contract  production  were  45%  lower  than  that  of  specialized  farms  owned  by  the  processing 
companies.  Small farmers had significantly lower labor costs because of access to unremunerated family labor 
for which markets are missing, and much lower costs of supervising, transporting and recruiting labor input; and 
because they did not pay any government benefits.  And also pest control costs were lower due to better crop 
monitoring and thereby lower chemical use.  Further, small farmers yields in vegetable production were 20% 
higher than on the firm’s own farms. 
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heterogeneous  farm  structure  with  some  farms  able  to  deliver  the  desired  supplies.  For 
example, some international dairy companies and foreign investors target larger farms as 
their preferred suppliers and only reach out to smaller suppliers if they need them to secure 
supplies.
12   
  These developments have major implications for the development of agricultural 
structures in these countries. As private-sector-driven institutions develop to address these 
different supplier bases, these institutions will in the longer run have an important impact on 
the  resulting  and  evolving  agricultural  structures,  with  the  initial  structure  having  an 
important impact on the one evolving in the medium term. Hence, the existing differences are 
not necessarily a transitional (temporary) phenomenon, but are likely to have long-lasting 
impacts on the agricultural structures, because institutional innovations which are emerging 
to address the constraints and opportunities posed by the current structures, are “locking-in” 
the existing structures in a long-run institutional framework.  
 
Farm Structures and Poverty in Global Supply Chains 
So far we have concentrated solely on the question whether small farms are able to 
participate in global supply chains.  We have not addressed the issue whether if they are 
integrated they are able to capture part of the surplus which is created in these global supply 
chains.  Neither have we addressed the issue whether rural households are necessarily better 
off by participating as small farmers in these modern supply chains than as employees on 
large scale farms.  This particular, and admittedly quite narrow, focus is representative of 
much of the debate that has taken place on this issue over the past decade, both in academic 
and policy circles.  
                                                 
12 It should be noted that “large” is a relative concept, even in neighbouring countries and within a single sector. 
For example, in Hungary, large dairy farms are farms with a few hundred or thousands of cows, in Poland farms 
with more than 20 cows, and in Romania farms with more than five cows.   25 
While there was regular mention of the rent distribution issue, very few studies have 
actually formally analysed or empirically measured the welfare effects for small farms in 
these chains.
13 Moreover, the issue of potential benefits for rural households through labor 
markets from large farm employment has been generally ignored.  
As far as I know, the only studies which have actually empirically measured income 
and poverty effects and/or studied the impact of large farm employment are by Maertens and 
Swinnen (2009) and Maertens et al (2009).  These studies find that for the case of vegetable 
exports in Senegal, rural households benefit strongly from participation as either contract 
farmer or as worker on large farms.  Moreover, the poorest households appear to benefit at 
least as much, or more, from household members working on the large farms and in the 
processing facilities.  These findings are very important as they put the welfare implications 
of the small farmer issue in a very different perspective, and they suggest that whether small 
farms are included in these chains, or not, is unlikely to be a good indicator in itself of the 





In  this  paper  we  draw  lessons  from  two  important  global  changes  in  food  and 
agricultural systems over the past 25 years as quasi-natural experiments on the optimality of 
farm structures.  The first is the transition process in former Communist countries from a 
centrally planned and government organized system to one organized by individual agents 
and the market.  The second change is the rapid globalization of food chains which has 
integrated consumers, food companies, and farmers and has lead to important restructuring in 
production, trading and marketing systems across the globe and in particular in high value 
markets which have been spreading to transition and developing countries.  
                                                 
13 Some other studies have tried to measure effects on investment and product quality (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004) and on indicators of income shortfalls (Minten et al 2009).    26 
The first conclusions are that farm structures that have emerged from the transition 
process are much more diverse than expected ex ante and that this diversity is to an important 
extent  determined  by  economic  mechanisms  which  are  influenced  by  a  combination  of 
different reform choices and exogenous factors, in particular relative factor endowments, 
technology, scale economies, market imperfections and existing (pre-reform) institutions.   
Relative factor endowments and technology are important. These differ enormously 
across countries.  In relatively labor intensive agricultural systems, the benefits of shifting to 
family farms (from corporate farms) are larger while the disruption costs are lower.  That is 
why we observe a strong correlation between factor intensities and the growth of family 
farming: corporate farms remain much more important in land and capital intensive farming.   
In countries with labour-intensive technologies the shift from large-scale collective farming 
to  small-scale  individual  farming  caused  dramatic  gains  in  technical  efficiency  with 
relatively  small losses in  scale efficiency.  In capital and land intensive  regions, gains  in 
labour  productivity,  if  any,  came  primarily  from  large  farms  shedding  labour  with 
privatization of the farms. 
  Scale economies matter and vary by commodity.  For example, grain production 
tends to have more economies of scale than, e.g. dairy or vegetable production.  Therefore, 
within a country one may observe strong differences in farm organizations.  The most 
extreme example is Kazakhstan where the northern grain belt is dominated by huge farms, 
while in the southern part of the country one finds much more small farms, e.g. in cotton 
production.   
  Third,  imperfections  in  output  and  input  markets  and  existing  institutions  are 
important as existing institutions, for e.g. product marketing and input supplies, have been 
designed  to  serve  large  scale  farms.    This  institutional  framework  affects  the  relative   27 
efficiency  of  family  farming  and  the  incentives  for  household  to  leave  the  large  scale 
framework. 
Another conclusion is that “non-traditional” farm structures have played an important 
role during transition since they were relatively efficient organizational forms to address the 
specific  institutional  and  structural  constraints  imposed  by  the  transition  process.    Such 
organizations  may  allow  farmers  to  gain  access  to  inputs,  marketing  channels  and  other 
services  in  an  environment  where  spot  markets,  if  any,  function  poorly.    In  summary, 
corporate  farms  and  “non-traditional”  large  farming  organizations  are  more  likely  to  be 
(relatively)  efficient in  the  specific institutional  environment  and  structural  conditions  of 
transition.    However,  the  extensive  use  of  land  by  corporate  farms  in  several  transition 
countries is also influenced by significant transaction costs in the land market, monopoly 
power in the regional land markets, and property rights imperfections.  
  Yet, while these structures are strongly influenced by transition conditions, they may 
have long lasting effects for the development of agricultural structures in these countries. As 
private-sector-driven  institutions  develop  to  address  these  different  supplier  bases,  these 
institutions will in the longer run have an important impact on the resulting and evolving 
agricultural  structures,  with  the  initial  structure  having  an  important  impact  on  the  one 
evolving  in  the  medium  term.  Hence,  the  existing  differences  may  not  necessarily  a 
transitional  (temporary)  phenomenon,  but  are  likely  to  have  long-lasting  impacts  on  the 
agricultural structures, because institutional innovations which are emerging to address the 
constraints and opportunities posed by the current structures, are “locking-in” the existing 
structures in a long-run institutional framework.  
  Such private sector institutional innovations have come in various ways, but have 
been important elements of the globalization of modern food chains.  These processes have 
had important impacts on the types of product that have been demanded and the way the   28 
production  takes  place,  and  the  organization  of  exchange  within  the  supply  chains.    In 
particular, contracting and vertical coordination in supply chains has grown strongly as part 
of  this  process.  Where  these  chains  have  emerged  they  have  introduced  vertically 
coordinated systems to help to overcome production constraints of their suppliers and as such 
enhance the quantity and quality of their supply base.  Examples of these are extensive and 
interlinked contracting systems.   
Partly as a result of these initiatives there is more diversity than often argued in the 
farms that are integrated in global food chains.  A series of recent empirical studies which are 
based on more rigorous data collection and analysis show that there are both large and small 
farms involved production for these chains.  A substantial share of the suppliers in these 
globally developing supply chains are small farmers, but there are regions and sectors where 
large farms are the dominant suppliers of produce in these chains.    
A final conclusion relates to the welfare and poverty effects of the farm structures in 
these supply chains.  Emerging evidence suggests that arguments using farm structures as an 
indicator  of  the  welfare  or  poverty  effects  of  the  globalization  of  food  chains  may  be 
misleading and that the very poor may benefit as much or more from working on large scale 
farms than from their potential role as small farmer in these chains.  
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Appendix 
 
Some farm characteristics of the EU-15  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
More than half of farmers are older than 55 years. 
Three quarters are part-time farmers.   
96% are family farms.   
59% of all farms cultivate 5 hectare or less. 
3% of all farms cultivate more than 100 hectares. 
75% of all Mediterranean farms cultivate 5 hectare or less. 
75% of Portuguese cattle herds have less than 5 cows. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Eurostat   34 
Figure 1.  Transition and farm structures 
 
a.  Change in the share of agricultural land used by individual farms (%)  
over first 10 years of transition by region 
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Figure 3: Labor adjustment and farm restructuring in transition  
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   Source: Swinnen and Rozelle (2006) 
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Figure 6 : Patterns of joint labor adjustment and farm restructuring in Central 
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- CEH is average of Czech, Estonia, Hungary, RLL is average of Romania, Latvia, Lithuania 
- 8 years after reforms is 1997 for CEEC, except Slovenia (1996), and 1998 for FSU 
Source: Swinnen et al (2005) 
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Figure 7. Farm fragmentation and the share of agriculture in employment  
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Source:  Swinnen and Vranken, 2005 
 
 
 